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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, Deceased, . _·
."f.:'·- .
L.~·~. .j.
.Appellant,
vs.
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS
BANK, a Utah Corporation,
Resp-ondent.
District Court Docket No. 2437.
AND
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as. the Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle Case No. 7614
T. Harmston, Deceased, HELENE
E. GILLIS, MARION EUGENE
HARMSTON, ROGERS T. HARMSTON and FRED HARMSTON,
Appellants,
vs.
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and
EDGAR LABRUM and VEDA
MURRAY LABRUM, his wife,
Respondents.
District Court Docket No. 2513.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEME:NT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
The Statement of the case contained in Appellants'
Brief is correct so far as it goes, except that one of the
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mortgages foreclosed by the Farmers & Merchants
Bank was for $2,500.00 and not $3,000.00 as stated in
Appellants' Brief. (R.· 265.) (Throughout this Brief
the judgment Roll is indicated by the Letter R and
the transcript by the letters Tr.) The reference to
some of the facts disclosed by this record should, in
our opinion, be given in greater detail than· that contained in Appellants' Brief, and there are other facts
not mentioned in Appellants' Brief which, as we view
them, are necessary to an understanding of the questions which divide the parties to this controversy.
As stated in Appellants' Brief, in the action
brought against the Farmers and Merc~ants Bank,
the plaintiff seeks to set 'aside the mortgage ·foreclosures
prosecuted by the bank against Roger T. Harms ton
as Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston,
deceased, et al. To the amended complaint filed in
this case the Bank filed a demurrer to each of the two
causes of action alleged in the Amended Complaint.
The demurrers are hoth general and special and both
causes of action are attached by the demurrers (R.
200-201). The demurrers were overruled (R. 205).
The defendant Bank claims that the demurrers should
have been sustained. As .indicated in Appellants' Brief,
most of the Facts are not in dispute. Briefly the
facts as alleged in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint are
admitted by the defendant Bank.
The:r;e is no controversy as to the existence of the
following facts.
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Isabelle T. Harmston died intestate
on December
.
.
11, 19~7. At the time of her death she owned the property described in the mortgages given to the Farmers
and Merchants Bank.
.

For a time the Utah Savings and Trust· Company
acted as administrator of Isabelle T. Harmston'-s estate.
On July 31, 1937, Isabelle T. Harms ton made;; executed
and delivered to the Farmers and Merchants Bank
her promissory note for $4,500.00, which note was
secured with a mortgage executed by Mrs. Harmston
on part of the real estate involved in this proceeding.
On October 19, 1937, Mrs. Harmston executed and
delivered to the Farmers and Merchants Bank another
mortgage in the sum of $2,500.00, which note was also
secured by a mortgage on part of the p-roperty involved
in this action. The mortgages were duly recorded in
Duchesne County, the same being the county in which
the property w-as situated. The property was leased
at the time the same was mortgaged and the leases were
assigned to the bank as additional security. Prior to
bringing the foreclosure proceedings, claims were presented to th_e Utah :Savings and _T~ust Company,; wh~ch
at the time such claims were presented, was the ·administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, De·ceased, and such claims were by the ·administrator approves.
. On December 7, 1940, the Utah Savings and Trust
Company was removed as administrator of the estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, and Roger T. HarmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ston' the . plaintiff herein, was by the court · ordered
appointed · administrator .of said estate in the stead
arid place of the Utah Savings and Trust Company.
The order required Roger T. Harmston to take the
oath of office and furnish a bond in the sum of $1,500.00
if a corporate bond.
Roger T. Harms ton furnished the required corporate bond and the same was filed on March 8, 1941.
At the time of trial there was no record in the Probate
Files of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, or in the
other court records, showing that Roger T. Harmston
took the oath of office prior to February 4, 1948. Nor
do the probate files show that letters of administration
were issued to Roger T. Harmston prior to that date.
It is further alleged in plaintiff's Amended Complaint herein and by the Answer of the defendant herein
admitted that on May 9, 1941, the Farmers and Merchants Bank filed its complaints to foreclose the
mortgages on the property mortgaged to the bank by
Isabelle T. Harmston. That in such action Roger T.
Harmston, as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle
·T. Harmston, was nH~med as one of the ·defendants;
that after the complaints were filed in said action
Summons wer~ placed in the hands of the Sheriff of
Duchesne County and on May 13, 1941, the said ·Sheriff
personally served such Summonses upon Roger T.
Harmston as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle
T. Harmston, deceased. Plaintiff in his Amended
Complaip.t ;alleges that in truth and in fact, Roger T.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Harmston was not at the time of the commencement
of the actions to forclose the mortgages or at the time
of the service of such summonses upon him, the administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston.
It is further made to appear that on July 17, 1941,
judgment by default was entered against Roger T.
Harmston, and in favor of the Farmers and Merchants
Bank, foreclosing the two mortgages executed by Isabelle T. Harmston during her lifetime; that pursuant
to such decrees of foreclosure, the property was advertised for sale and sold by the Sheriff of Duchesne
County, and in due time on March 12, 1942, the Sheriff
of Duchesne ·County executed and delivered a Sheriff's
Deed to the Farmers and Merchants Bank, the purchaser of the property at the Sheriff's sale, and that the
bank has, since March 12, 1942, been in possession of
the property so sold and has collected the rents and
profits derived from said property. The foregoing
facts are alleged in plaintiff's Amended Complaint
and will be found on Pages 173 to 199 of the Judgment
Roll. In its answer the Bank admits all of the allegations contained in plaintiff's Amended Complaint except
defendant alleges on information and belief that Roger
T. Harmston was the administrator of the Estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, fro~ and after May 9, 1941. The
Answer and Counterclaim of the defendant bank will
be found on Pages 209 to 230 of the Judgment Roll.
It will thus be seen that the only issues of fact
raised by the pleadings so far as the same affect the
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foreclosure proceedings is whether or not Roger T.
Harmston had taken his oath of office and Letters of
Administration had issued to him when the Complaint
was filed and when he was served with Summons.
In its Answer and Counterclaim the defendant
bank· sought to defeat plaintiff's attempt to set aside
the judgments of foreclosure and if that could not be
done, then to foreclose its mortgages in this action
pursuant to the allegations of the Counterclaim.
It will thus be seen that by the Stipulation mentioned in Appellants' Brief it was agreed that the first
issue that should be tried was whether or not the
mortgage foreclosures precluded the plaintiff from
prosecuting the pres.ent action. Of course, if it should
be determined that the mortgage foreclosures were
valid and by reason thereof the property foreclosed
was no longer a part of the Estate of Isabelle Harmston, _then there is no occasion to again foreclose such
mortgages pursuant to the allegations of defendants'
Counterclaim. If, on the other hand, it should be determined that the mortgage fo~eclosures were invalid, then
the issues raised by the ·Counterclaim must be tried.
The evidence which was offered and received
touching the controversy as to whether or not Roger
T. Harmston did or did not take an oath o~ office on or
about March 8, 1941 is brought here for review by a
transcript of the evidence.
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As stated in appellants' Brief, there was no oath
of office of Roger T. Harmston at the time of the trial
. in the files of Isabelle T. Harms ton's estate, ·nor was
there any other court · record that an oath of office
had been filed, except in each of the mortgage £oreclosures the court found:_ ''That Roger T._ Harmston
h~s been appointed as administrator of tlle Estate of
Isabelle- T. Harmston, n·eceased, and he is now the-'·duly
appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased." Tr. 101
as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for $4,500.00 and
Tr. 117 as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for
$2,500.00.
At the commencement of the trial, it was agreed
that the foreclosure proceedings were regular in every
particular except with respect to whether or not Roge:r
T. Harmston had taken his oath of office and whether
or not Letters of Administration had issued to him
at or before the time the foreclosure actions were
brought, and .at or before the time service of summons
was had upon Rogers T. Harmston. (Tr. 3-4.)
Plaintiff called the County ·Clerk of Duchesne
County, who identified the files. in the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased. He testified that the
only Letters of Administration in the files were dated
February 10, 1948 (Tr. 7). He further testified that
the only oath of office was one taken before R. J.
Hogan, on February 4, 1948, which appears to have
been filed on February 10, 1948 (Tr. 8).
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,It further is made to appear that prior. to Sep-_
tember 4, 1940, Roger T. Harms ton, one of the heirs
at law of Isabelle T. I!armston, had filed a petition
praying that he be appointed administrator of his
mother's estate; that he personally appeared in_ court
represente-d by his counsel (Tr. 9-10). That Roger T.
Har~n~ton was appointed administrator of th~: _.Estate
to take effect on November 18, 1940. The order was
not signed until December 4, 1940 (Tr. 12). On March
8, 1941, a bond dated February 27, 1941, for the sum
of $1,500.00 was filed in which bond Rogers T. H-armston is named as principal (Trs. 14-15). County Clerk
Merrill further testified that the Register of Actions
failed to show that any Letters of Administration were
issued to Roger T. Harmston prior to February 10,
1948 (Tr. 17).
The County Clerk, on cross e~amination, further
testified that the one-half of the outside cover of the
files -in the Isabelle H;:armston Estate had been torn
off (Tr. 19). That the fact that the cover on the files
in the Isabelle Harmston Estate was in part torn off
was first called to his attention in 1947, at which time
he put on a new cover (Tr. 20).
On 'Cross examination Roger T. Harmston testified that he had collected the income from· Lots 5 to
12, Block 16, Plat A, Roosevelt Townsite (owned by
the Estate of Isabelle
Harmston) since he bought it
in for taxes. (Tr. 46-47.) That he signed the bond in

r.-
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the files- of his mother's estate. (Tr. 57.) That the
property he bought for taxes is the prop.erty of his
mother's estate. (Tr. 58.) That he has been collecting
the rent on that property. (Tr. 59.) That he didn't
remember whether he was or was not served with
summons in the foreclosure proceedings. That he did
know the pro:rerty of his m·other was being fhreclbsed.
(Tr. 64.)
G. Arthur Goodrich was called as a witness by the
defendant and testified that he was County Clerk of
Duchesne County, Utah, from 193.5 to 1942. He identified defendant's Exhibit.... 3 as being a letter, the latter
part of which was dictated by him. It will be noted
that among other things, it is said that ''On March
8, 1941, Rodger T. Harmston filed his bond arid oath
of office and is now the acting and qualified administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. '' He
testified that he dictated that letter and over objections he further testified that while he did not actually
remember the oath of office referred to in the letter
as being in the office when the letter was dictated, the
oath must have been in the office when the latter ·was
dictated; otherwise he would not have dictated the
same (Tr. 78). That when he dictated letters relative
to the records in the office he always had such records
before him (Tr. 79).
I

Arlene Smith was called as a witness by defendant and testified that she was a deputy clerk of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Duchesne County from February, 1940, until Novem.
ber, 1942; that Mr. Goodrich, the ·County Cler:K, aic.
tated letters to her (Tr. 84-5). That when Mr. Good.
rich dictated letters about the records in the office
he would examine the records and dictate the letters
from such· records. That was his uniform practice.
That she was in the office when defendant's Exhibit
3 was written so that she probably wrote the same
(Tr. 85 ).
Edna T. Hartman was called as a witness by the
defendant and testified that she worked as a deputy
county clerk from 1935 to spring of 1941, except for
two months in the summer; that she did some more
work in the fall of 1943; that when Mr. Goodrich, the
County Clerk, dictated letters as to matters relating
to the records in the office, he always dictated the same
with the records before him (Tr. 90).

J. Rulon Morgan was sworn and testified for the
defendant b:ank: That he was the attorney for the
Farmers :and Merchants Bank and conducted the mortgage foreclosure proceedings in the two cases involved
in this· proceeding; that· he testified in such foreclosure
proceedings; that when he so testified he had before
him the files in the matter of the Estate of Isabelle
T. Ha~mston, and ther~ was an oath of office of Roger
T. Harmston (Tr. 94 and 9p). This testimony of Mr.
Morgan was received over the objection of counsel for
plaintiff.
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Not,vithstanding Roger T. Harmston testified at
considerable length he· did not testify that he· had not
taken an oath of offic.e in the matter of the Estate
of Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased.
As stated in Appellants' Brief, the property involved. in the case against the Lab rums was purchased
from the Bank after it secured the Sheriff's Deed, pursuant to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings.

As
pealed
Claims
In The

an additional Reason Why the Judgment ApFrom Should Be Affirmed. The Defendant
That The Court Was In Error In Its Ruling
Following Particulars:
STATEMENT OF CROSS ERRORS

I. The Trial Court w:as in error in overruling the
demurrer of the defendant to the effect that the allegations contained in plaintiff's first cause of action
do not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action (R. 200).
IT. The Trial Court was in error in overruling
the ·demurrer of the defendant to the effect that the
allegations contained in plaintiff's second cause of
action· do not state ·sufficient facts to constitute a cause
of !action (R. 201).
III. That the Trial Court erred in overruling the
demurrer to each of the two causes of action alleged
in the amended complaint upon the ground that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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allegations therein contained are uncertain and ambiguous- in- that no facts are therein -alleged upon which
plaintiff, in this case, claims that he has a· meritoriou-s
defense to the foreclosure of· the mortgages which
were·· foreclosed by the defendant and which mortgage
foreclosure proceedings plaintiff herein seeks· to have
-vacated ·(R~ 200 & 201).
IV. The Court was in error in overruling the demurrer to each of the causes of action upon the ground
that the court was and is without jurisdiction to vacate
or amend the judgments attacked because of the pro. .
visions of U.C.A., 1943_, 104-14-4 (R. 201).
ARGUMENT
It will be noted that no claim is made that the
defendant was not personally served with Summons.
The Complaints in the foreclosure proceeding were
filed May 9, 1941 (R. 177). Service of Summons- was
had personally on Roger T. H·armston May 13, 1941
(R. 178). It also appears from the pleadings that the
Judgments sought to be vacated were entered on July
17, 1941 (R. 195 & -199). The sheriffs' deeds were
issued on March 13, 1942 (R. 179 & 186). This action
was commenct3d by filing a Complaint on February 20,
1948 (R. 160). Thus, 6 years, 9 months and 11 days
elapsed between the time the plaintiff in this action and
the defendant in the. foreclosure action was s-erved with
Summons in the foreclosure action and the time the
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present action 'vas commenced. There is nothing in the
record which even remotely i~dicates any justification
for this long delay. Of course, the value of the property involved has doubtless increased, but such .fact
could not well be urged· as an excuse for such delay.
While we shall contend that the judgment appealed
from should be affirmed because the facbr fo-q.11d. by
the trial court must be sustained, we wish at the outset to direct the attention of the court to the questions
of law raised by the demurrers to plaintiff's Amended
·Complaint.

POINTS ONE AND TWO
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO ANY
RELIEF.

While there are a few cases to the contrary, the
authorities generally are to the effect that judgments
shown by court records impart absolute verity, especially when attached collaterally and that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that the court was
without jurisdiction. Freeman on Judgments 5 Edi.
tion, page 785, Sec. 375 and cases cited in note 14 to
the text. On pages 792-93 of the same volume the
learned author says :
''And it is so necessary that confidence should
be reposed in court of a higher -character as well
as in records of such courts that on the whole
and in view of all the considerations affecting
the subject, it is the only safe rule to give the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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decisions of -courts of general jurisdiction full
effect so long as they remain in force rather
than to leave them open to be attached in every
way and on all occasions. Being domestic judgments, they can, if erroneous, be reviewed by
proceedings instituted directly for the· purpose
and reviewed on error or by a new trial, ·and
if the danger is imminent and special, relief can
be temporarily, if not finally, obtained by application to a -court of equity. Any other rule
with regard to judgments of such courts would
be attended in its application with very great
embarrassment and would be very dangerous
in its general operation. The general good clearly
requires and has heretofore established the rule
that domestic judgments of courts of general
jurisdiction cannot be attached -collaterally.''
Again on Pages 807-808 of the same volume, it
is said:

''A finding or recital showing that the court
had jurisdiction is, in the vast majority of the
states, not disputable when a judgment based
thereon is drawn in question collaterally, particularly where the other p·ortions of the record
are silent as to jurisdictional step·s as. where
the judgment finds that jurisdiction attached
and no process or service or return of process
appears in the record. In such eases the record
will be taken to affirmatively show jurisdiction.''
In sup·port of the Text the following cases are
cited, which support the text: Kavanaugh vs. Hamilton,
53 ~Colo. 157; 125 Pac. 512; Virginia and 'West Virginia
Oaal ·Co., vs. Charles, 251, Fed. 83; Searl vs. Galbreath
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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73 lli. 269. To the same effect is S(J).lt L·ake City vs.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 82 Utah 179; 22 Pac.
(2), 1048.
The authorities also teach as we view them, that
the attack made by the plaintiff up·on the judgments
of foreclosure is a collateral and not a direct attack.
In Volume 1, page 608 of Freeman on Judgments, 5
Edition, a collateral attack on a judgment is thus
explained:
''If on the other hand the direct purpose and
aim of the proceeding is .to obtain some other
relief than the vacation or setting aside of the
judgment, and the attack upon the judgment
is merely incidentally involved, it will be considered 1a collateral attack, though relief from
the judgment may ·also be necessary under the
circumstances. Thus, where the primary relief
in a suit is the recovery of land and the setting
aside of a judgment through which defendants
claim title is only an incident to that relief, the
rights of the parties must be adjudged by the
rules applicable to collateral ·attack.''

O'Neill vs. Bohien, 13 Idaho 721; 93 Pac. 20; Wilcox
vs. Superior Court, 151 Appeal Division 297; 186 N. Y.
Supp. 377.
In the case from Idaho just cited, the law is thus
stated:
"The attack upon a judgment is collateral if
the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contempl'ates some other relief, or
results, than the mere setting aside of the judgment, although the setting aside of the judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
· ment .may. be necessary to se·cure such independent P":U'Pose."
·
.
. To the same effect is z;tier:mill vs. Nash, 94 Utah
271, 75 Pac. (2d) 157.
..

It will -~~ noted from. the Amended Complait~t that
the p~aintiff in . this action ~s, among other things,
seeking an accounting of the rents and profits· that
defendant bank has collected since it went into possession of the property pursuant to its Sheriff's Deeds.
Plaintiff also seeks to recover the land covered by the
mortgage, inclu~ing that sold to the Labrums. That
being so, the attack upon the judgment is collateral and
it !appearing from the Amended Complaint that all of
the proceedings had in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings are regular on their face, the plaintiff may
not be heard to complain.
The doctrine above stated will also be found stated
in Volume 1 of Black on Judgments, Sec. 252, Page
306.
Moreover "One who is objecting to a judgment on
the ground that it was entered without personal jurisdiction must limit his. subsequent appearance in the
case to the sole purpose of having the judgment vacated. In this and other cases of act which amounts to
a general :appearance confers jurisdiction and defeats
any objection based on its lack.'' Freeman on J udgments, Volume 1, ·Sec. 265, page 530; B111rdette vs. Corgan, 26 Kan. 102; Whitehead vs. Post 2 Ohio D.iv. Reprint 4·68; Yorke vs. Yorke 3 N.D. 343; 55 NW 1095;
Myers vs. Myers, 27 Ore. 133; 39 Pac. 1022; Gilbert
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Arnold Land Co. vs. O'H(}).re, 93 Wis. 194; 67 N.W. 138.
Even though the applicant in terms limits his appearance to the special purpose of vacating the judgment
if his application embraces other grounds than the
jurisdictional one it is an· appearance on merits. Freeman· on Judgments, 5 Edition, Volume 1, Page 552,
··,._,
Sec. 280-281.

POINT 3
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING
TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO EACH OF
THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS.

It will be observed that in his Amended Complaint
the plaintiff (touching the matter of having a defense
to the foreclosure of the mortgages), contents himself
with merely alleging that the plaintiff as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, has now
and there always has been a good and meritorious defense to the aforementioned civil actions (1931 and
1932), but has never had_ an opportunity to p-resent the
same (R. 182 and 88). Obviously, the language just
quoted does not inform. either the court or counsel of
any facts which plaintiff claims constitutes a defense
to the mortgage foreclosure suits. In this connection
the authorities generally hold that the facts themselves,
rather· than the conclusions to be drawn fr~m them,
must be stated and it is: not sufficient merely to state
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facts from which a defense may be inferred. Th:at the
moving party should disclose his cause of action or
grounds of defense with such particularity as enables
the court to determine whether or not it is good and
sufficient on the merits. Freeman on Judgrri.ents, 5
Edition, Vol. 1, page 560, Sec. ·283 and cases there
cited.
POINT 4.
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN OVERRULING THE
DEMURRER TO EACH OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION
UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT WAS AND IS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO VACATE OR AMEND THE
JUDGMENTS ATTACHED BECAUSE OF THE PRO~
SIONS OF U.C.A. 1943 - 104-14-4.

Under the provisions of U.C.A. 1943-104-14-4, a
party who deems himself :aggrieved, may, within ninety
days after a judgment is rendered, apply to the court
to be relieved from such judgment because of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. So far
as appears from the allegations of the Amended Complaint, none of the grounds mentioned in the statute
are here present. It is made to appear from the allegations of the Amended Complaint that the plaintiff
was personally served with .summons; that from the
time the Sheriff's Deed was issued the Bank was in
the. possession of the property and collected the rents
and profits therefrom. So far as ·ap·pears from the
allegations of the Amended Complaint, nothing whatsoever was done by way of questioning the validity of
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the decrees of foreclosure until the present proceeding
was commenced, whicl!, as we have heretofore stated
in this Brief, was 6 years, 9 months and 11 days after
Summons was served upon the plaintiff herein in the
fore~losure action. Courts of equity do not look with
favor on such stale claims. People vs, Swalm, SO ·Cal.
199; 22 Pac. 66.
Turning now to the matters relied upon by the
Appellant for a reversal of the judgment, it will be
noted that he relies primarily upon the claim· that
the facts found by the trial court are not· supported
by competent evidence.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS ON THE PLAINTIFF
TO PROVE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE
COUNTY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE
JUDGMENTS OF FORECLOSURE AND NOT ON THE
DEFENDANT TO SHOW THAT THE COURT DID HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENTER SUCH JUD.GMENTS OF FORE..
CLOSURE.

In our research we find the authorities generally
teach as· stated by our own court in the case of Intermill vs. Nash, supra, that:

''A judgment upon its face, or the· judgment
roll upon inspection,. may show, First, that the
court had jurisdiction of the res and p·arties ;
second, that the eourt did not have jurisdiction
of the res or of the partie~s, or third, the record
may be silent on the question of jurisdiction. In
the first instance, the record supplies all the
evidence ; in the second instance, the record
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shows the judgment void, and in the third situa.
tion, the record imparting verity, jurisdiction in
the . c,ourt entering · the judgment is presumed,
since every ·court has the initial right and duty
to pass upon its own jurisdiction.''
In :the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the record
shows that Roger T. Harmston, as administrator. of
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, was personally
served with summons, and it is so -alleged in the
Amended Complaint as to each of the causes of action
(R. 178 and 185). In its Findings on each of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the court found that
Roger T~ Harmston has been appointed as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased,
and he is now the duly appointed, qualified and· acting administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased ( Trs. 101 and 117). Thus, looking to
the record in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings,
it affirmatively appears that the court had jurisdiction
of the res and the parties. It is only by going outside
of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings and examining the proceedings in the Matter of the Estate of
Isabelle -T. Harmston, that any documents are found
missing touching the quest1on of whether or not Roger
T. Harmston was or was not the qualified administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. The records
in that estate shows that Roger T. Harmston was appointed administrator and he furnished and signed a
bond as ordered by the court. It is so :admitted (Trs.
43). That Roger T. Harmston signed such bond (Trs.
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57-58). He did not, however, remember signing or filing
a bond (Tr. 44). Thus, the record in the M1atter of the
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston affirmatively shows
that all was done touching the appointment and qualification of Roger T. Harmston, :as administrator of Isabelle T. Harmston's.. E:state, except taking the oath.
There is nothing in the ··records of that estate; ex;cept
the absence of any record showing that an oath . of
office was taken, that shows, or te.nds to show, that
an oath of office was not taken. Thus, as stated by the
authorities in the absence of a record to the. contrary,
the record imparts verity and jurisdiction of the court
on entering a judgment is presumed,- since every court
has the initial right and duty to pass upon its own
jurisdiction.
We are mindful that there was not involved in
the mortgage foreclosure proceedings the question of
the validity of any order or judgment rendered in the
matter of the Estate of Isabelle .T. Harmston. However, if an order or judgment had been made in the
matter of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, and such
order or ~udgment were to be attached on the g~ound
that Roger T. Harmston w:as not the administrator
of such estate because the record failed to show that
he had taken an oath of office, such a contention could
not be sustained because the court would presume that
he had taken his oath of office ·and the same had been
lost and the clerk had neglected to make a record of
the oath and Letters of Administration. Such as we
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understand it is the doctrine of this court as announced
in the case of Intermill vs. Nash, supra; Amy vs~ Amy,
12 Utah 278, 142 P'ac. 1121; Hoagland vs. Hoagland,
19 Utah 108 ; 57 Pac. ·20. ·· If. ·the court would assume
that an administrator had taken the oath of office in
an attack made upon a judgment or order entered in
the probate proceedings, for stronger reasons will the
court assume that an oath of office was taken in another action where such court expressly finds that an
oath of office had been taken.
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT
WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT.

As we gather from plaintiff's Brief, it 1s contended that no evidence was admissable touching the
question of whether of not Roger T. Harmston had
taken an oath of office other than that contained in
the Probate Proceedings in the Matter of the Estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, and the records
which the law provides should be made of such pro..
ceedings. If that is so, then the plaintiff must, of
necessity, fail in his attempt to vacate the judgments
of foreclosure which he seeks to vacate. As we have
heretofore pointed out and as this and the co~rts
generally hold, a judgment is not vulnerable to attack by a mere showing that the record fails to show
that jurisdiction was .acquired. If the attack is col..
lateral, th~ record itself must affirmatively show that
the court rendering the judgment was without juris-
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diction to render the same before the judgment may be
vacated. It is not sufficient to show merely that the
record fails to show th·at the court did h·ave jurisdiction because in such case the court will presume that
the court rendering the judgment did have jurisdiction. On the other hand, in a direct attack on a judgment, evidence may be received to show that the court
did not have jurisdiction in those cases where the record is silent as to whether or not the court did have
jurisdiction and :also in those cases where the court
erroneously finds that it did have jurisdiction. Indeed
it is of the very essence of making a direct attack
upon a judgment to thereby permit the introduction
of evidence, both oral and documentary, to show that
the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction.
As we understand plaintiff's position in this case,
he contends that by his ple!ading he is making a direct
attack on the judgments in the foreclosure proc_eedings.
If we are correct in our understanding of plaintiff's
claim in such particular, then it follows that he may
offer evidence that dehors the record if that court was
in error when it found in the m<;>rtgage foreclosure proceedings that Roger T. Harmston was the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. ·Even in a
direct attack unless there is affirmative evidence showing that Roger T. H:a,rmston was not such administrator, the court is bound to conclude that he was the
administrator notwithstanding the record is silent as
to whether he did or did not take an oath of office.
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With the foregoing doctrine in- mind, let us briefly
examine the evidence offered at the trial of this case:
Roger T. Harmston was called as a witness, but
he failed to testify that he did not take an oath of
office. Indeed it is a fair inference from the evidence
he did give that he did not know whether he had or had
not taken an· oath of office. Notwithstanding he had
signed and filed a bond, he did not remember of ever
signing or filing such bond (Tr. 44). If he could not
remember -signing or filing !a bond, it is doubtful if
he could remember anything about taking an oath of
office.
The only other evidence offered by the plaintiff
was the records and files in the Matter of the Estate
of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, together with certain books that the Clerk of the Court is required to
keep and therein record certain proceedings and documents of the court. In the records which the law requires the clerk to keep, there was- an absnece of any
record showing that an oath of office had been taken
and of course there was no record showing that an
oath of office had not been taken. While, in our opinion,
the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case, even
if his, pleadings constitute a direct att-ack, still the defendant went forward with evidence tending to show
that the plaintiff did take an oath of office at or about
the time he filed his bond. Needless to say that if the
plaintiff may offer evidence other than the records
tending to show that the court rendering a judgment
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did have jurisdiction.
Defendant called four- witnesses who testified as
to facts which ·showed or tended to show that Roger
T. Harinston had taken an oath of office and ·Letters
of Administration had issued to him prior to the time
the actions were comtnenced to foreclose the mort~
gages held by the defendant bank. We have heretofor directed the court's attention to such evidence.
Briefly the evidence is this: G. ·Arthur Goodrich testified that he was County Clerk of Duchesne County,
Utah, from 1935 to 1942; that he dictated the document marked Exhibit 3 (Tr. 77) ; that it was his practice, while acting as County Clerk, in answering inquiries about the documents filed in his office, to have
the documents before him when he dictate-d letters concerning the same; that while he did not actually remem-.
ber what was in the files of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston when he dictated Exhibit 3, he would not
have written that letter if an oath of office. . was ~Qt
in the files (Trs. 78). Both Mrs·. Arlene Smith and
Mrs. Edna T. Hartm!an testified that they had worked
in· the office with Mr. Goodrich while he was :county
Clerk and that he always had the records of the cou·rt
before him when he wrote letters concerning the contents thereof (Tr. 89-91). In the letter, Exhibit 3, it
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ston filed his bond and oath of office and is now the
acting and qualified administrator of the e~tate .of
Isabelle T. Harms ton.'' ·
J. Rulon Morgan testified that when he took the
judgments of foreclosure which are involved in this
controversy, he had before him the files in the Estate
of· Isabelle. T. Harmston, deceased, and that in such
files was an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston (Tr.
94). There is also evidence that the files in the matter
of th·e estate of Isabelle T. Harmston had been somewh-at mutilated and it was necessary to put a new cover
on the same (Tr. 19). In the light of this evidence, ~and
the fact that in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings
the trial court found that Roger T. Harms ton was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of
the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, the trial court in
this case could not have foun·d other than as did the
court. in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
We have no quarrel with the law stated on Page
15 of Appellants' Brief where a quotation is taken from
32 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 738, (inacurately
stated to be on Page 728), Sec. 809 (a), where it is
stated '' 'I:ha t proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees . of courts of record cannot be proved by parole
evidence, unless the record is lost or destroyed or
othe-rwise inaccessible and a properly authenticated
copy or transcripf thereof cannot be obtained.'' The
converse is also true.
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In this ca.se the evidence shows that when the
mortgage foreclosure proceedings :were had there was
no oath of office of Roger T. Harmston in the matter
of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, but no such oath
of office could be found at the time of the trial of
this case in the court ~elow. It would be a travesty
on the law if a judgment of :a court could be rendered
vulnerable to attack solely because a p·art of the files
in a matter had been lost or destroyed and the Clerk of
the C-ourt had neglected to make a proper record
thereof.
ROGER T. HARMSTON WAS THE DE FACTO IF NOT
THE DE JURE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED, AND AS SUCH
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON HIM WO·ULD BE BINDING
UPON THE ESTATE.

The record in this case shows not only that the
pl!aintiff was, by the court, appointed administrator
of the e-state of Isabelle T. Harmston, and that he
furnished and signed a bond as fixed by the court,
but also that he collected some of the rents of the
property belonging to the estate (Trs. 46).
If the plaintiff did not take the oath of office when
he filed his bond, he was negligent in failing to do
so and he m'ay not take advantage of his own negligence. Harris v. Coates, et al, 69 Pac. 475. To the
same effect is Harris v. Chipman, 9 Utah 101. In the
case of Anderson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 76 Utah
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324, 289 Pac~ 156, it is held that an action brought by
an 'administrator before he has .qualified will not be
dismissed if he qualifie.s during the course of the trial.
In the case of Colorado Development ·Co. v. Greer, 80
Pac. (2d) 914; 920 it is said: "One may not at the
same time perform the functions of an office and_ maintain successfully that he has ahandoned it. Tooele
County v. DeLa Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59 Pac. (2d) 1155;
106 A.L.R. 182. ''
Before concluding this brief we should probably
call to the attention of the court the case ·of Roger· T.
Harmston, et al vs. Kenneth Labrum, et al. In that
case the plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the lands
therein described. The Labrums acquired title to those
lands by purchase from the Farmers and Merchants
Bank after the Bank had secured a Sheriff's Deed
pursuant to its mortgage foreclosure. As we understand plaintiffs' position, it is that the hank acquired
no interest by its mortgage foreclosure proceedings
and therefore had no title to pass on to the Labrums.
It will be noted that no attack whatsoever is made
upon, nor is there any mention of the decree of foreclosure in the complaint ag-ainst the Labrums. That
being so, any attempt to attack the mortgage foreclosure
decrees in that case would clearly be a collateral attack on the judgment in the foreclosure proceedingS,
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and as such binding upon the plaintiff under the doctrine announced by the cases heretofore cited from this
and other jurisdictions touching the binding .effect of
judgments when an attempt is made to attack the same
in a collateral proceeding..
We submit the judgments appealed from should be
affirmed with costs to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

J. RULON MORGAN
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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